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10 Heuristics as cognitive tools
for pursuing sustainability
Janne I. Hukkinen and Katri Huutoniemi
1 Introduction
The mission of this volume includes a seeming paradox. On the one hand, the
book discusses ad hoc ways of framing and dealing with wicked sustainability
challenges; on the other, it aims to develop a new approach to tackle such
challenges. Can there be a systematic approach for ad hoc ways of doing
things?
We think so. From the epistemological point of view, we are facing a
potential God trap. Any novel way of explaining the world within a higher-level
explanatory framework than the existing ones can itself be criticized as just
another explanation within yet another higher-level explanatory framework,
resulting in endless explanations without closure. Yet we believe we are not
in such a trap. The ecological pragmatism that characterizes the chapters of this
volume stresses the importance of crafting tools of observation for very diﬀerent
environmental contexts. Despite the variation in contexts, we think there is
something systematic about the toolbox.
We suggest that this systematic can be understood from the perspective
of autopoietic epistemology (Fuchs 2001; Luhmann 1995; Maturana and
Varela 1980), which provides a scheme to describe the toolbox of observation
in diﬀerent environmental contexts. In this view, the heuristics discussed
in the chapters can be seen as instruments with which cognitive actors
adapt to and survive in particular environments (cf. Gigerenzer 2008; Todd
et al. 2012). Conceptualizing the ad hoc tools of researchers as heuristics
is thus not only a move away from the rationalist programme of classical
epistemology, which focuses on the epistemic goal of having justiﬁed
beliefs, but also an attempt towards a more embodied understanding of
knowledge.
In this chapter we explore the cognitive foundations of the heuristic
approach that unites the volume. We discuss the key challenges taken up in
this book, sustainability and transdisciplinarity, in the light of embodied,
autopoietic epistemology. The question we address is whether better under-
standing of autopoiesis and embodied cognition could provide a basis for
designing transdisciplinary heuristics for dealing with complex sustainability
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problems. We will show that an embodied approach to solving sustainability
problems does not refer to a higher-level explanatory framework, but to a
search for solutions within and between the autopoietics of complex systems.
From this perspective, we argue, heuristics may open up a new direction
in transdisciplinary sustainability studies. The rationale is twofold. First,
heuristics and their building blocks resonate with the capacities prepared by
the genes of a species. Unlike ‘disciplinary’ tools of observation, some simple
heuristics are likely to make sense across social and environmental contexts,
as individuals share the same biological and ecological inheritance (Todd
et al. 2012). Second, the explicit notion of knowledge as an instrument of
adaptation and survival, rather than a transcendent good, puts transdis-
ciplinarity at the centre of our knowledge enterprise. Human knowledge is
not simply about the world, but inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by the world
(Cilliers 2010; Ison 2010). In this sense, transdisciplinary research can itself
be understood as a co-creative heuristic that, when successful, can inﬂuence
the autopoiesis of disciplinary systems.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we take a closer look at the
dilemmas of observation, raised in Chapter 1, from the perspective of
autopoietic epistemology. We then discuss heuristics as cognitive devices with
which autopoietic observers make sense of the sustainability challenges they
face in particular environments. As an exploration of this approach, we
analyze simple heuristics of sustainability from the perspective of cognitive
linguistics and embodied cognition (Clark 2011; Feldman 2006; Lakoﬀ
and Johnson 1999; Shapiro 2011; Thelen 2000), and illustrate our arguments
with frequent reference to the cases presented in earlier chapters. We then
return to the more general epistemological challenge of transdisciplinarity,
and sketch out elements of a transdisciplinary heuristic as a form of
observing.
2 Observer’s dilemma and the theory of autopoiesis
While psychologically oriented cognitive science has explained how we
process, share and integrate information, both social scientiﬁc and biological
approaches to cognition have addressed information in the context of
complex systems. Since the world itself contains no information, only unstruc-
tured complexity, information is information for an observer in this world. What
things are, they are for an empirical observer, and an observation is what it
becomes in relation to other observations. An observer is anything equipped
to apply distinctions to its environment or, more precisely, that part of the
world which is an observer’s niche. Some observers are results of natural
evolution, and positioned in a biophysical environment – such as a body, its
immune system, or brain; or an entire species, such as bacterium or human
species. Other observers are results of social forces or relations, and positioned
in a human culture – such as groups, organizations, nation states, social
movements and sciences.
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This concept implies that the ability to ‘know’ is attributed to the autop-
oietic character of observers, rather than some distinctly human property,
such as consciousness or intersubjective agreement. A deﬁning characteristic
of the organization of autopoietic systems is their ability to observe their
surroundings, that is, their ability to develop an epistemological relation with
their environment. This unavoidably involves a selective construction of
reality, which only makes sense in relation to the autopoiesis of speciﬁc
entities (Kunneman 2010).
Human beings make distinctions about the world according to their
biological cognitive structure, the cultural networks they are part of, and their
positions in those networks. In this view, individuals are not self-contained
observers, but nodes in multiple networks of observing. Our biological and
evolutionary inheritance as human beings constitutes such a network – that
of human species – but it is only one of the networks that observe ‘through’
us. As social and cultural beings, we observe the world around us in the
light of our cultural inheritance, language most importantly but also other
systems of interpretation, which are self-referential modes of observing.
From the perspective of autopoietic epistemology, knowledge looks
very diﬀerent from what it is when viewed from the perspective of classical
epistemology. However, such a view is not incompatible with modern
cognitive science. In their challenge to prevailing models of Western thought,
George Lakoﬀ and Mark Johnson (1999) argue that human reason is:
(1) embodied; (2) evolutionary; (3) universal only in that it is a capacity
all humans share; (4) mostly unconscious; (5) largely metaphorical and
imaginative; (6) and emotionally engaged. Their position reﬂects a tradition
of understanding that is not commonly appreciated in science but which is
increasingly informed by the last 40 years of cognitive science research
(McClintock et al. 2003).
What are the implications of this view to scientiﬁc knowledge? According
to social theorist Stephan Fuchs (2001, 2002), disciplines produce knowledge
in the sense that they create and maintain coherence against entropy
and dissolution. Coherence is the outcome of connectivity and ties within a
network, and then of higher internal than external connectivity and density.
As such networks ‘learn’, their results become increasingly dissimilar to the
original inputs, including the world at large, but more similar to themselves.
The epistemological implication is that learning, or accumulation of
knowledge, is not an increasing proximity to the real world, but an increasing
self-similarity. Because of this self-similarity, a network, such as a discipline, is
always ‘simpler’ or more coherent than the world at large.
In observing the world, disciplines develop distinctive patterns of
perception and technologies of knowing. These become institutionalized as
the default modes of operation that provide some unity and continuity to the
ever-changing themes and referents of these operations themselves. But, as
Lyytimäki and Petersen (Chapter 3), Banister (Chapter 4) and Paloniemi
and Vainio (Chapter 9) in this volume show, they also produce patterns of
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blindness, because ‘a way of seeing something is always, at the same time, a
way of not seeing something else’ (Burke 1984 [1933]: 49). The institutional
modes of observing, which become the black boxes of a discipline, are them-
selves a condition for learning, especially for cumulative advances, since
learning cannot occur if everything changes at the same time – then there is
not progress but breakdown (Fuchs 2001: 287).
The cumulative advances of knowledge, however, have little relevance as
such beyond the conﬁnes of the discipline’s niche. Outside of its niche, an
observation does not ‘disclose’ the world, but adds itself to the world. The
world is now more, not less, complex than before. Hence the complexity or
wickedness of ‘real world problems’, such as sustainability. As Frodeman
maintains (Chapter 11, this volume), more disciplinary knowledge production
will not resolve problems such as climate change, but reveal ever more areas
of ignorance and thus of further research.
It is in this context that the transdisciplinary challenge of sustainability
seems most urgent. What is the status of knowledge, and how can it help us
on our way towards sustainability? The embeddedness of knowledge
in its context of production is often understood as causing biases and
distortions and thereby undermining the epistemic status of scientiﬁc knowl-
edge. An alternative conclusion, however, would be that knowledge is a real
accomplishment of the structural coupling between an observer and its niche,
and has thus an embodied rather than transcendental meaning. While not
necessarily antithetical to the usual constructivist view, this conception
would trigger very diﬀerent connotations by linking constructivism with the
realism of the embodied process of cognition, which is a product of nature
and nurture (e.g. Maturana and Varela 1992; Proulx 2008). This suggests
we should search solutions to sustainability problems by making explicit use
of the autopoietic dimension of knowledge.
3 Heuristics for sustainability from an autopoietic perspective
Autopoietic systems have an interest in surviving and reproducing or
expanding, and undergo structural changes as adaptive responses to their
environment. The concept of autopoiesis was originally developed by two
cognitive biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (e.g.1980),
but the social theorist Niklas Luhmann (e.g. 1995, 1996) has argued that the idea
applies not only to biological but also to a large number of non-biological
systems. Since we are concerned about our survival as a species, the systems
of interest here are coupled human–environment systems, also known as
social–ecological systems. The cognitive heuristics of a human being can be
understood as adaptive responses to natural environments, both ecological
and social (Gigerenzer 2008).
Let us re-iterate the situation of concern as it was identiﬁed in Chapter 1.
In sustainability challenges, such as the diverse cases described in the preced-
ing chapters, we typically have a group of people who are concerned about the
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sustainability of a particular environmental entity, which in contemporary
environmental studies is increasingly characterized as a social–ecological
system. The system can be deﬁned in various ways. According to Elinor
Ostrom (2009), for example, the system is composed of a resource system
(e.g. a forest), resource units (trees), resource users (foresters) and a govern-
ance system (forestry institutions and organizations). The group applies some
cognitive strategy, a heuristic, to identify and tackle the challenges. In line
with the axiom of Simon’s scissors, success in facing the challenges depends
on how well the heuristic that the group applies matches the situation in
the social–ecological system. As we shall see, however, from the autopoietic
perspective this matching does not refer to links between separate entities,
but rather an embodied coupling of the group (the observer) and the social–
ecological system (the observed). We call this coupling a heuristic (the act of
observation).
The group resolving sustainability challenges may range from a local
community tackling its resource management issues to a group of experts
developing analytical solutions to global environmental problems (Ostrom
2005). Since heuristics are reasoning devices, the group can be thought of
as an epistemic community, that is, ‘a speciﬁc community of experts sharing a
belief in a common set of cause-and-eﬀect relationships as well as common
values to which policies governing these relationships will be applied’ (Haas
1989: 384). The community may evolve during the search for a solution to the
environmental problem, involving possibly only so-called ‘stakeholders’ at an
early stage but incorporating ‘analysts’ at a later stage. But the way
the members of the community formulate their beliefs and values about
the social–ecological system is constituted by – in fact, embodied in – the
social–ecological system itself.
The epistemic community and its environment are not separate subsystems
but rather function as an autopoietic entity – a social–ecological network. It
is a network of relational processes that produce components which
continuously regenerate and constitute the network in a particular domain, or
what we called ‘niche’ in Section 2 (Maturana and Varela 1980: 78–79).
The critical diﬀerence with classical epistemology is that the components of
the social–ecological system observed are also constitutive elements of the
cognitive act of observation. In the language of Maturana and Varela (1980:
109), a proper observation of an autopoietic system as a unity requires that
the distinction of system limits takes place in the domain of the components
of the system. This account of observation is qualitatively diﬀerent from the
prescription found in many existing models of social–ecological systems,
according to which stakeholder knowledge needs to be ‘incorporated’ in the
models (see e.g. Ostrom 2007: Table 1; Walker et al. 2002: 8). Such approa-
ches involve a translation of ‘stakeholder’ knowledge into the language of
a model of human–environment interaction developed by ‘analysts’. The
autopoietic notion of observation requires instead that analysts and stake-
holders understand social–ecological interaction as equally valid observers in
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the same niche of observation, with no translations of knowledge in between;
and that the niche of observation is also the niche of the social–ecological
system in question.
Recent advances in cognitive linguistics and embodied cognition theory
provide guidance for specifying the components of a heuristic for
sustainability such that those components are also components of the social–
ecological system that the epistemic community strives to understand.
According to embodied cognition researchers, ‘cognition depends on the
kinds of experiences that come from having a body with particular
perceptual and motor capabilities that are inseparably linked and that
together form the matrix within which reasoning, memory, emotion, lan-
guage, and all other aspects of mental life are embedded’ (Thelen 2000: 4).
Concepts are therefore embodied as well: ‘An embodied concept is a neural
structure that is actually part of, or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of
our brains’ (Lakoﬀ and Johnson 1999: 20).
The fundamental embodied concept that connects subjective experience
with sensorimotor experience is known as the primary metaphor. It is
formed as a mapping from the source domain of sensorimotor activity to
the target domain of subjective experience (Lakoﬀ and Johnson 1980,
1999; Gentner 1983; Gentner et al. 2001). As Jerome Feldman explains
(2006: 202), ‘when subjective and sensorimotor experiences are brought
together in an episode, both domains are coactive. This, according to
association learning theory, causes the strengthening of connections between the
neural circuits supporting the diﬀerent modalities. The new, strengthened
connections physically constitute the metaphorical mapping.’ For example, in
the primary metaphor aﬀection is warmth, the source domain’s sensorimotor
experience of temperature is projected onto the target domain’s subjective
experience of aﬀection (Lakoﬀ and Johnson 1999: 50–54). It is easy to
see how embodied experiences of the human animal evolution, such as being
held in the arms of one’s mother, would generate associative mappings such
as this (Hukkinen 2012).
We suggest that the primary metaphor is a good candidate for a con-
stitutive component of an epistemic community’s heuristic for sustainability,
because it is in the niche of the observer, the observed and the act observation.
It is in the niche of the observing human being in the sense that the ﬁring
of neurons takes place in the human mind. It is in the niche of the observed
social–ecological system in the sense that the generic physical characteristics
of any social–ecological system – such as force, gravitation, enclosure, location,
path, physical artifact, colour, warmth, texture and smell – trigger the mind’s
sensorimotor experiences. And primary metaphor is in the niche of
observation because observation is an episode of the mind interacting with
the social–ecological system during which the subjective and sensorimotor
experiences are automatically co-activated at the neuronal level. Any heuristic
for making sense of a social–ecological system that is built from primary
metaphors is therefore structurally coupled with the system, because the
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sensorimotor activity triggered by human interaction in the system is
automatically mapped at the neuronal level onto the universally shared
abstractions expressed in the primary metaphors. Observation of the
social–ecological system and the heuristic model triggered by it can thus only
take place in the niche of the components of the system – a signature of
autopoiesis.
The implications of autopoietic epistemology are profound in comparison
with classical epistemology. Studying a social–ecological system necessitates
being part of that system, not outside of it. Any eﬀort to take analytical
distance from the system, which classical epistemology posits as a prerequisite
of objective observation, signals to the autopoietic analyst a structural
inability to observe. Any eﬀort to distance oneself from emotional attachment
to the things under observation signals to the autopoietic analyst a neglect of
the reality of observation, namely, that all observation automatically triggers
emotions. And a vision of perfecting a conceptual system that abstracts
from the sensorimotor reality of the social–ecological system is incompre-
hensible to the autopoietic analyst, who aims to uncover the sensorimotor
experiences that a particular abstraction mobilizes. These contrasts point
toward a need to specify the tools of autopoietic observation, or the heuristics
for sustainability.
4 Cognitive tools for pursuing sustainability
As Peter M. Todd, Gerd Gigerenzer and their colleagues (2012) note,
cognitive heuristics have virtually never been treated as normative, only as
descriptive models. A cognitive science perspective suggests that ‘people
take their heuristics oﬀ-the-shelf, use them unknowingly and automatically,
and rarely worry about their accuracy. An inherent part of human nature,
these broader, less discriminating sorts of heuristic generally trump strategic
decision making’ (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000; see also Paloniemi and Vainio,
Chapter 9, this volume). In political behaviour, for example, people often lack
the contextual knowledge needed to use heuristics intelligently, or in fact to
use them at all (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Therefore, in the ordinary
parlance, as well as in rationalist discourses of decision making and problem
solving, heuristics is usually linked with ‘biases’, ‘shortcuts’ and other mainly
ﬂawed procedures.
However, given recent developments in the normative study of cognitive
heuristics (Todd et al. 2012), combined with the increasing chasm between the
rationalist programme of classical epistemology and the complexity of human
knowing, we believe that heuristics could play a key role in tackling sustain-
ability problems. While many attempts to advance sustainability, not least
those that advocate transdisciplinarity, end up with conﬂicting views, com-
plicated procedures and institutional inertia, cognitive heuristics may provide
welcome ‘shortcuts’ towards more sustainable paths of action. In this section,
we apply the above concepts from cognitive linguistic and embodied cognition
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to show how heuristics for sustainability can be deﬁned, identiﬁed and reﬁned
with a view to inﬂuence the behaviour of autopoietic actors.
4.1 Fit between heuristics and sustainability challenges
Not all heuristics are equally helpful in guiding behaviour towards greater
sustainability. As we have seen in the previous chapters, some heuristics
simply work to maintain the status quo (Paloniemi and Vainio, Chapter 9)
or prevent us from seeing alternative paths of action (Lyytimäki and
Petersen, Chapter 3; Banister, Chapter 4). One way to evaluate heuristics for
sustainability is to assess the goodness of ﬁt between the heuristic and the
sustainability issues it aims to tackle. In the light of autopoietic theory,
this assessment has two aspects. As an instrument of adaptation, a heuristic
for sustainability is both an explanation of a social–ecological system as
an emergent structure capable of renewing itself, and a cognitive attractor
of individuals whose recruitment reinforces the integrity of the system
(Hukkinen 2012; Antal and Hukkinen 2010). We therefore distinguish two
measures of ﬁt, empirical and cognitive.
‘Empirical ﬁt’ is the test usually applied to scientiﬁc theories, measuring
the extent to which the theory’s description of a sustainability phenomenon
matches the observed reality of the phenomenon. In contrast, ‘cognitive
ﬁt’ measures the extent to which the theory’s description of sustainability
matches the cognitive reality of observers, such as human beings. Cognitive
ﬁt is determined not by the properties of a particular theory but by the
way in which it resonates with the autopoietic dynamics of an observer.
Cognitive ﬁt has two aspects, cognitive appeal and cognitive optimality
(Hukkinen 2012). A structure of meaning, such as a scientiﬁc theory, or in our
case, a heuristic for sustainability, has cognitive appeal when it contains
primary metaphors associated with positive subjective experiences, such as
happiness, aﬀection and goodness (Hukkinen 2012; Lakoﬀ and Johnson
1999). A heuristic for sustainability can also be evaluated in terms of its
cognitive optimality, which measures the ease with which the human mind
can imagine and simulate the heuristic (Fauconnier and Turner 1998;
Hukkinen 2012). When a heuristic is cognitively optimal, the human mind
can ‘run’ it eﬀortlessly in imaginative mental simulation, without violating
the integrity of the heuristic and its component relations (Fauconnier and
Turner 1998).
We focus in the following on the signiﬁcance of cognitive ﬁt for the
development of transdisciplinary sustainability heuristics, and illustrate our
arguments with reference to the cases presented in earlier chapters. We divide
the design of transdisciplinary heuristics for sustainability into two stages:
identiﬁcation and reﬁnement of heuristics. Identiﬁcation of heuristics refers to
various cognitive tools with which knowledge originating in radically diﬀerent
traditions and practices can be integrated so that it becomes useful for tackling
sustainability challenges. Reﬁnement of heuristics refers to ways of improving
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the cognitive appeal and optimality of the sustainability heuristics identiﬁed
in the ﬁrst stage.
4.2 Identifying sustainability heuristics
Identiﬁcation of sustainability heuristics draws on cognitive tools of knowledge
integration, which include the various methodologies of analogical alignment.
These range from the identiﬁcation of simple metaphors to complex blends of
metaphors. Many cognitive scientists argue that the human mind encounters
and understands new things by constructing analogies (Lakoﬀ and Johnson
1999; 1980; Gentner et al. 2001; Fauconnier and Turner 2002).
The principle of constructing analogies is simple. We disaggregate an unfa-
miliar phenomenon (also known as the target space) into relations between
elements. In trying to understand the target space, we look for similarities
between its relations and those of phenomena more familiar to us. Having
found among the familiar phenomena one (also known as the base space)
with relations that best match those of the target space, we map the relations
of the base space onto the target space (cross-space mapping). We say that the
target space is ‘like’ the base space.
But analogies are also themselves elements of more complex mental
structures called conceptual blends. The blend does not simply add the two
partial spaces of knowledge. Instead, blending completes what are only barely
distinguishable patterns in the two partial spaces of knowledge, which results
in a new space of knowledge qualitatively diﬀerent from the partial inputs
(Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Hukkinen 2008).
The ability to construct conceptual blends is a prerequisite of the
search for transdisciplinary solutions to sustainability problems. An autopoietic
view of knowledge is not, as such, very promising for transdisciplinary
collaboration, with its imagery of self-suﬃcient systems aiming at their own
reproduction, maintenance and survival (Maturana and Varela 1980). Yet
the notion of observation as an ability of the observer to make distinctions in
the niche of the observed indicates an interactive potential. From the
autopoietic perspective, blending is a process of cognitive entrainment in which
two or more separate epistemic communities successfully synchronize their
respective heuristics for sustainability. As a result, formerly separate
communities may begin to merge into one if they discover that they operate
and make observations in the same social–ecological niche. The emergence of
epistemic communities and collective construction of blends can even be
facilitated with deliberative procedures (Hukkinen 2008; Levänen and
Hukkinen 2013).
The preceding chapters contain abundant evidence of the applicability
of both simple and complex analogical alignments in transdisciplinary
heuristics. Their value is evident especially in transdisciplinary problem
framing, which is the overall theme covered in Chapters 2 through 5 in Part I
of this volume. An example of a straightforward analogy is Banister’s
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(Chapter 4) use of Barbara Adam’s timescape approach, which draws an
analogy between space and time to arrive at the analytical concept of
timescape, in an analogy with the spatial concept of landscape. Huutoniemi
and Willamo (Chapter 2) develop a systematic approach for identifying more
complex analogical alignments useful for solving sustainability problems.
In what they call outward oriented thinking, objects of observation are
understood in relation to other objects located outside the description of
the object of observation, either horizontally (when the alignment takes place
across substantially diﬀerent objects) or vertically (when the alignment takes
place across objects located at diﬀerent system levels).
Paloniemi and Vainio (Chapter 9) explore the use of cooperative heuristics
in natural resource management, and show that dialogue between landowners
and policy implementers is likely to facilitate biodiversity policy. Compared to
another commonly used socio-cognitive heuristic, trust, dialogue seems to be an
eﬃcient strategy for the diﬀerent stakeholders to pursue their respective goals
in harmony.
4.3 Reﬁning sustainability heuristics
Reﬁnement of transdisciplinary sustainability heuristics aims to improve the
cognitive appeal and optimality of the analogical alignments identiﬁed earlier.
Recall that a heuristic for sustainability has cognitive appeal when it contains
primary metaphors associated with positive subjective experiences, while
cognitive optimality measures the ease with which the human mind can ‘run’
the mental constructs contained in a heuristic (Fauconnier and Turner 1998;
Hukkinen 2012; Lakoﬀ and Johnson 1999).
Assessment of cognitive appeal is by no means straightforward, because the
subjective experiences with which a particular sensorimotor experience is
associated in a primary metaphor cannot be categorized as unambiguously
positive or negative. Some primary metaphors connect particular sensorimotor
experiences with reasonably unambiguous positive or negative experiences, such
as aﬀection is warmth, happy is up, and bad is stinky. Others are normatively
more ambiguous, such as important is big, intimacy is closeness and more is
up. Finally, there are primary metaphors whose normative connotations
are diﬃcult to identify. Instead, these metaphors link logical or physical
abstractions with sensorimotor experiences, for example, in categories are
containers, similarity is closeness and time is motion (Table 10.1).
We suggest that the variation in the emotional content of primary meta-
phors oﬀers a powerful tool for reﬁning sustainability heuristics, because it
forces sustainability analysts to face head-on the inherently subjective and
emotional content of even the most objective scientiﬁc messages. At one
extreme, should the analysts resort to primary metaphors with unambiguous
links to emotional subjective experiences to convey their message, they
commit themselves to triggering strong positive or negative emotional reac-
tions in the target audience. At the other extreme, should they use heuristics
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composed of primary metaphors with links to physical or logical abstractions,
they choose to tone down the emotional reactions of the audience.
The preceding chapters provide evidence of the signiﬁcance of cognitive
appeal in reﬁning sustainability heuristics. Lyytimäki and Petersen (Chapter 3)
reveal the social blind spots of resorting to the cognitively appealing but
normatively ambiguous metaphor of ‘ecosystem services’. As ‘service’ and
‘support’ are closely related (Roget’s International Thesaurus 1977; Merriam-
Webster Thesaurus 2013), ecosystem services evoke the primary metaphor
help is support (Table 10.1). However, as the authors point out, it is important
to ask who is being helped and what is considered help. Since a primary
metaphor is evoked, there is a danger that individuals unconsciously and
without reﬂection accept ecosystem services as an unambiguous social good.
Lyytimäki and Petersen reveal this danger by highlighting the diversity of
human uses, perceptions and valuations pertaining to the notion of ‘service’.
Banister (Chapter 4) reframes the inﬂuential metaphor of ‘travel time’ by
widening the spectrum of primary metaphors it mobilizes. The predominant
paradigm of transport policy understands ‘travel time’ as implying the
primary metaphors time is motion and diﬃculties are burdens (Table 10.1).
Table 10.1 Primary metaphors.
Subjective experience Sensorimotor experience
Aﬀection is Warmth
Important is Big
Happy is Up
Intimacy is Closeness
Bad is Stinky
Diﬃculties are Burdens
More is Up
Categories are Containers
Similarity is Closeness
Linear scales are Paths
Organization is Physical structure
Help is Support
Time is Motion
States are Locations
Change is Motion
Actions are Self-propelled motions
Purposes are Destinations
Purposes are Desired objects
Causes are Physical forces
Relationships are Enclosures
Control is Up
Knowing is Seeing
Understanding is Grasping
Seeing is Touching
Source: Compiled from Lakoﬀ and Johnson (1999); Feldman (2006).
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Since time is motion, more time consumed for the same amount of movement
is a diﬃculty, as Banister illustrates. And since diﬃculties are burdens, it is
necessary for transport policy to minimize the travel time spent. Banister
proposes an alternative, which eﬀectively mobilizes the primary metaphors
organization is physical structure, help is support, categories are containers and
purposes are destinations. Banister argues that the purpose of transport policy
ought to be the social allocation of travel through physical transport
infrastructure. In other words, he is eﬀectively arguing that social organization
is physical transport infrastructure. According to Banister, this social organi-
zation can prevent the inequalities and waste resulting from the minimization
of travel time. In other words, the novel social allocation and the physical
infrastructure help to support the social good. Banister also recognizes that
the objective of travel time minimization reﬂects only one among many social
meanings attached to travel time (categories are containers), and that this
variety ought to be reﬂected in the direction of future transport policies
(purposes are destinations). Thus, Banister is able to strengthen his argument
for novel transport policy by invoking powerful alternative primary metaphors.
Cognitive optimality shifts the focus of analysis from the primary meta-
phors to conceptual blends, that is, more complex metaphorical constructs
composed of primary metaphors. Fauconnier and Turner (1998) argue that
the ease with which the human mind can run a mental construct is measured
by cognitive optimality. They propose ﬁve interrelated optimality principles
for conceptual blends: integration, topology, web, unpacking and good
reason. Here we take just two of them – topology and web – under closer
inspection, because these two actually incorporate elements of the remaining
three. A conceptual blend has topology when the relations of an element
observed in the blend match those of its counterpart in an input space. The
blend is an integrated web when manipulating the blend as a unit maintains
its connections to the input spaces without surveillance or computation
(Fauconnier and Turner 1998: 162–63). To illustrate the workings of topology
and web, let us take a closer look at Huutoniemi and Willamo’s contribution
to this book in Chapter 2.
Huutoniemi and Willamo develop a heuristic model of sustainability issues
that they call the ‘architecture of an environmental problem’ (here we refer
to it as AEP). It is a conceptual blend between the ‘ecological system’ and the
‘human system’, as the authors treat environmental problems ‘as emergent
and systemic features of human–environment interaction’. They stress that
this distinction does not imply an ontological dualism between humanity
and nature. However, it is epistemologically helpful, because what deﬁnes
an environmental problem is its association with ecological exchange between
human systems and ecological systems. In their ontological view, human
society is a social construction emerging from natural evolution. As a result
of these emergent properties, the rationales of human systems diﬀer from
those of the natural systems. It therefore makes heuristic sense to depict the
AEP (or what other researchers in the ﬁeld have called the social–ecological
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system) as a causal arrow diagram made of the human system with its inter-
nal causal interactions and the ecological system with its internal causal
interactions, and then link these two systems with a ‘discharge/intake’ box
and numerous causal feedbacks (Chapter 2, Figure 2.2).
The AEP is a cognitively optimal conceptual blend. It displays topology,
because the relations of the elements observed in the blend match those of its
counterparts in the inputs. The elements and relations presented in the ﬁgure
belong either to the human system or the ecological system. Obviously, what
is included in the AEP is only a partial depiction of all the elements and
relations of the human system and the ecological system, respectively, as only
those elements and relations pertinent to human–environment interactions
have been incorporated. The AEP also contains the hallmark of blend topol-
ogy, namely, an element identiﬁable in both inputs: the ‘discharge/intake’ ele-
ment, which is a neutral event for the human system, but becomes
consequential in the ecological system, comparable in its signiﬁcance to ‘eco-
logical factors’ that can cause an environmental ‘change’ and ‘impact’
(Chapter 2, Figure 2.2). The AEP is also an integrated web, because manip-
ulating it as a unit maintains its connections to the inputs without surveil-
lance or computation. Cause-and-eﬀect relations pertaining to intentional
human action form a seamless web with ecological causes and eﬀects.
Greenhouse gas emissions from industrial activities in the human system, for
example, can easily be understood as feeding into the ecological system, only
to cause ecosystem changes that feed back into the human system in the form
of intensiﬁed storms, ﬂoods and droughts. The AEP can be mentally simu-
lated with ease, despite the fundamental diﬀerences in the underlying ratio-
nales of the two component systems.
In Chapters 6 through 9 (Part II of this volume), which focus on
transdisciplinary problem solving, cognitive optimality manifests itself in
more complex manners. It cannot be determined at the level of an individual
human mind, but in interaction between individuals who aim at a collective
goal. The heuristics identiﬁed by Pohl (Chapter 6) as well as Hall
and O’Rourke (Chapter 7) work precisely because they help individuals
to move beyond the autopoietic maintenance of individual identities
towards co-creative collective self-identiﬁcation which enhances their pro-
spects for reaching the goal. The variant of the Delphi method discussed by
Varho and Huutoniemi (Chapter 8) is likewise a technique for reﬁning the
heuristics of individuals through an iterative process of deliberation and
social learning.
5 Epistemology of transdisciplinarity reconsidered
We have come a full circle in the eﬀort to sketch an outline of cognitive
heuristics for sustainability. Recognizing the unproblematized status of the
observers within the disciplinary approaches to wicked sustainability pro-
blems, we went on to develop an autopoietic account of observation. From
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the autopoietic point of view, universally objective observation is impossible
because in a biological sense the act of observation requires that the observer
is in the same niche, that is, in the same frame of reference, as the object
being observed.
The biological fact of autopoiesis does not, however, question the useful-
ness of disciplinary approaches that rest on the assumption of universal
observation. It only repositions them. In some circumstances – as Huutoniemi
and Willamo, for example, illustrate in Chapter 2 – biologically false
assumptions about dichotomies such as the observer and the observed, or
humanity and nature, make perfectly reasonable sense. Disciplinary approaches
are sometimes useful heuristics that emerge in the human mind in the course
of human adaptation to speciﬁc social–ecological circumstances. This resonates
with Daniel Dennett’s hypothesis that although the ‘Cartesian theatre’ view of
the mind can be shown to be cognitively and biologically false, its persistence
in our thinking reﬂects its evolutionary usefulness for the survival of
the human species (Dennett 1991). Where does this going around in a circle
leave transdisciplinary inquiry of sustainability in the epistemological sense?
The notion of disciplines as autopoietic observers implies that the
relationship between observations made by diﬀerent disciplines is not logical
or conceptual, but empirical and historical. Disciplinary networks can
interact and communicate, even learn from each other, when there are actual
relations and bridges between them. This can initiate interdisciplinarity.
However, often interdisciplinarity turns into yet another specialty of its own,
administered by special centers, organizations and institutes (Fuchs 2001:
265–87). We thus need to ﬁnd a way out of the epistemological trap of narrow
self-referentiality.
An epistemologically viable basis for transdisciplinary inquiry might be
attained by systematically accounting for the observer in each act of
knowledge, that is, the origin of knowledge in a particular cognitive
system. As Edgar Morin (2008: 86) says: ‘We believe we see what is real; but
we see in reality only what this paradigm allows us to see, and we obscure
what it requires us not to see.’ This is indeed the crux of epistemological
complexity. However, Morin’s call for ‘a paradigm shift, one tending in
the direction of complexity’ seems to include a paradox. While it is true that
we cannot escape having a point of view, it is precisely in relation to a
viewpoint that any meaning is possible at all. We cannot deal with complexity
in its complexity, but we have to reduce that complexity when we try to
understand it. This means that some aspects of the system are always left
out of consideration. However, that which is left out interacts with the rest of
the system in a non-linear way and we thus cannot predict what the eﬀects
of our reduction will be (Cilliers 2010).
As there is no objective way to do this reduction, there are always choices.
This implies that dealing with epistemological complexity involves ‘ethics
of complexity’. The limits of disciplinary science do not so much pertain to
simplistic, reductive, or disjunctive thinking as such, though modern
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science suﬀers from all these, but more to its lack of responsibility for the
epistemological choices it makes. We see this as both an epistemological
and ethical rationale for transdisciplinarity. It is only by making our episte-
mological stakes and institutional blind spots visible and open to adjustment
that we can attain sustainability as a mutual goal between autopoietic
observers. Transdisciplinarity implies that disciplines and other epistemic
communities recognize each other as observers, and become more accountable
for their epistemological positions.
This rationale, we argue, might take the methodological discussion of
transdisciplinarity to a new level, which recognizes the earlier rationales of
integration and accountability (see Huutoniemi, Chapter 1, this volume),
but articulates them in an epistemologically more plausible manner. The
methodological challenge of transdisciplinary research, as we see it, is to
make sense of the world in the light of observations made by multiple
diﬀerent observers. In a messy situation, transdisciplinary researchers might
adopt the role of a second-level observer, and from that position, approach
the mess from a broader perspective. In the case of wicked sustainability
issues, transdisciplinary research would not only deal with the problems as
perceived by the stakeholders, but simultaneously explore the ways in which
these stakeholders extract problems from the mess. Such a task requires
adopting a constructivist and realist attitude at the same time in order to
understand how they see, not only what they see.
Note, however, that the constructivist, second-order perspective is not a
negation of the ﬁrst-order perspective – they can be understood as a duality
(Ison et al. 2007). The goal of transdisciplinary reﬂection is not to debunk
the accounts of observers, but to estrange them so as to be able to reﬂect them
from a broader perspective. In this sense, transdisciplinarity is closer to
‘reﬂective epistemology of practice’ (Schön 1983) or ‘systems practice’
(Ison 2010) than to sociology of knowledge, for example. Contrary to the
latter, the results of constructivist observation are not fed into a second-level
network of constructivists, to make a diﬀerence in that network, but back to
the original puzzle at the ﬁrst level. Constructivism is thus applied in an
ad hoc manner to help make sense of the situation of multiple observers with
diﬀerent observations. It does not imply commitment to any particular
constructivist epistemology, only that no observations exist unless they are
constructed. Transdisciplinarity, we argue, should remain unattached to strict
epistemological commitments, except the one that realizes the relational
nature of knowledge.
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